Fiscal multiplier in the Russo–Japanese War : A business cycle accounting perspective by GUNJI Hiroshi & MIYAZAKI Kenji
Fiscal multiplier in the Russo Japanese War :
A business cycle accounting perspective












　In this paper, we use business cycle accounting, introduced by Chari et 
al.(2007, Econometrica 75 (3), 781–836), to estimate the fiscal multiplier in 
Japan during the Russo–Japanese War, 1904–1905. This event is considered 
to be a natural experiment for the following reasons. 1) The ratio of 
government spending to GNP was relatively greater than that of the other 
wars involving Japan. 2) As the battlefields were in Korea and China, the 
war caused little damage to Japan’s physical capital or labor supply. 3) The 
Russo–Japanese War did not involve any monetary transfer to the Japanese 
economy. 4) Before the war, people were not convinced that Japan and 
Russia would go to war. Using business cycle accounting, we estimate the 
value of the fiscal multiplier to be about 0.2 in the short run and about one 
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in the long run. These results are consistent with the previous literature, 
which estimates the multiplier in different sample periods using 
econometric models such as structural vector autoregression (VAR) 
models.
1. Introduction
　Although many researchers have estimated the fiscal multipliers of 
government expenditures, the estimates differ because of differences in the 
data and estimation methods used. Most government expenditures, 
however, are planned in the previous fiscal year, and thus they are not 
unexpected shocks. Economic agents make decisions using published 
imprecise data about government expenditure, which leads to a 
miscalculation of the fiscal multiplier.
　To avoid such miscalculation, some researchers use military expenditure 
as unexpected and temporary expenditure. Barro and Redlick (2011) use 
US data from World War II (WWII), and their reduced-form models of 
regression analysis estimate that the multiplier of military expenditure lies 
between 0.4 and 0.7. Using vector autoregression (VAR) models with war 
dummy variables, Ramey (2011) estimates the fiscal multiplier to be 0.6–
1.2. Furthermore, Owyang et al. (2013) use 1890–2010 US historical data 
and report that the fiscal multiplier of military expenditure is 0.7–0.9. 
These studies use all wars in their sample period as shocks to government 
spending. However, some of the wars may have been expected many 
months before the outbreak of war.
　As an example of an unexpected war shock, we focus on the Russo–
Japanese War. To our knowledge, there is no structural empirical research 
for Japan that estimates fiscal multipliers using military expenditure. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, using the Russo–Japanese 
War as a natural experiment has some advantages.
　Moreover, to investigate the effects of the government spending during 
the Russo–Japanese War, this paper uses business cycle accounting (BCA), 
introduced by Chari et al. (2007).4） BCA separates factors that affect 
economic variables (real GNP, consumption, investment, and labor supply) 
into four wedges: efficiency, labor, investment, and government 
consumption. These wedges exactly replicate the allocation in the 
economy. Moreover, if we remove one of these wedges or three wedges, 
the model provides counterfactual experiments. Since the government 
consumption wedge consists of government spending and net exports, this 
method allows us to evaluate the effect of government spending.
　When estimating fiscal multipliers, BCA has more advantages than 
regression analysis and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. In regression analysis, several outbreaks of war would be required 
to estimate fiscal multipliers statistically. It is difficult to obtain sufficient 
such data for Japan. Furthermore, regression analysis requires appropriate 
regressors to avoid estimator bias, and VAR analysis requires appropriate 
structures to obtain efficient estimators, both of which pose problems in this 
context. Althogh BCA is based on a neoclassical growth model, as shown in 
Chari et al. (2007) and Sustek (2011), the wedges also can capture the 
fractions of New Keynesian DSGE models: e.g., sticky prices and sticky 
wages. This suggests that a fiscal multiplier estimated by BCA is not 
necessarily small, unlike neoclassical growth models.
　Although Braun and McGrattan (1993) and McGrattan and Ohanian 
(2010) analyze the effects of war using DSGE models, we use BCA to 
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analyze the effects of war. DSGE analysis specifies the structure and 
shocks of the model, and then compares the simulated and observed data. It 
is difficult for this approach to replicate the original time series and to 
estimate the effects of fiscal shocks accurately. If, of course, one introduces 
a infinite number of frictions into a DSGE, it can capture the actual data. 
However, it would be not possible. On the other hand, in BCA, wedges 
estimated from data can replicate the original data series. Therefore, we 
can estimate the effect of government expenditure controlling for other 
business cycle factors.
　In addition, BCA wedges represent several distortions of business 
cycles. As proved by Chari et al. (2007), for instance, financial frictions 
associated with the allocation of intermediate inputs correspond to the 
efficiency wedge and sticky wages correspond to the labor wedge. Because 
many types of friction correspond to one or more wedges, we do not have 
to be concerned about the specification of the model. Furthermore, BCA is 
conducted by a structural model, which al lows us to simulate 
counterfactuals and identify the effects of government spending and war. In 
contrast, reduced-form regression analysis does not have these 
advantages.
　This paper makes three contributions. First, to our knowledge, this is 
the first study to use data for the Russo–Japanese War to estimate the fiscal 
multiplier. Second, we utilize BCA to estimate the fiscal multiplier. Finally, 
we propose a new method for calculating the effect of wedges. Although 
most papers calculate the effect of wedges following Chari et al. (2007), 
their methodology does not allow for correlations between wedges. Our 
paper takes such correlations into consideration.
　The main conclusion of our paper is that BCA estimates the value of the 
short-run fiscal multiplier to be 0.20–0.22. We also estimate the long-run 
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multiplier to be 0.98–1.06. In other words, in the short term, the effect of 
fiscal expenditure on output is not very much, but in terms of long term, 
the change will be the same as or slightly above the size of fiscal 
expenditure on output. If fiscal expenditures are financed by current or 
future taxes and households reduce consumption equal to their present 
value, the effect on fiscal expenditure should be zero. However, in our 
simulation the effect is not zero. These results are consistent with the 
previous literature: e.g., Barro and Redlick (2011) and Owyang et al. 
(2013). Although Japanese economic growth and/or a wartime boom might 
bring about a long-run increase in output, we detrend our model, so the 
figures of the multiplier do not include those effects. From the historical 
point of view, although Japan’s fiscal expenditure during the Russo-
Japanese War accompanied various tax increases and finance by foreign 
bonds, it seems that there was an effect of stimulating the economy. In 
fact, since the size of fiscal expenditure was the largest before the Second 
World War, it is suggested that the scale of increase in output was large.
　The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief history of 
the Russo–Japanese War and demonstrates why using this war as natural 
experiments has some advantages. Section 3 provides a description of 
BCA. In Section 4, we explain how to calculate fiscal multipliers using our 
framework. Section 5 describes our data, Section 6 presents our estimation 
results, and Section 7 concludes. In two appendices, we provide details 
about estimating the spillover effects of the government wedge and 
constructing labor force data.
2. The Russo–Japanese War
　In this section, we describe a brief history of the Russo-Japanese War, 
Fiscal multiplier in the Russo–Japanese War:A business cycle accounting perspective
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and then discuss some advantages of this war for estimating the 
government multipliers.
　The Russo–Japanese War was fought between the Russian Empire and 
the Empire of Japan from 1904 to 1905. Much of fighting took place in 
northeastern China (the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern 
Manchuria) and the seas around Korea (Sea of Japan).
　In the Sino–Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan eliminated Chinese power 
in Korea and won control over the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. An 
alliance of Russia, France and Germany, however, pressured Japan to give 
back the peninsula in return for increased reparations. In 1898 Russia had 
pressured China into granting it a lease for the strategically important port 
of Port Arthur, at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, in southern 
Manchuria. In 1902, Japan signed a treaty with Britain that secured British 
intervention should any country join Russia in a war against Japan, 
effectively removing the threat of other European powers’ involvement if 
hostilities happened. Japan offered to recognize Russian dominance in 
Manchuria in exchange for recognizing Japanese dominance in Korea. 
Russia refused and demanded Korea north of the 39th parallel to be a 
neutral buffer zone between Russia and Japan. After negotiations broke 
down in 1904, the Japanese Navy gave a sudden attack against the Russian 
Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur, China.
　From the end of July 1904, Japanese forces besieged Port Arthur’s 
fortress town, accepting the surrender of the garrison in January 1905. In 
the meantime, in 1904 Japanese divisions had advanced into Manchuria, 
driving back the much larger Russian army. The final battle of the land war 
was fought at Mukden in late February and early March 1905. The battle 
cost both sides almost a third of their forces as Japanese troops outflanked 
Russian ones and took the town. The final large-scale encounter of the war 
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was the Battle of Tsushima. The Japanese engaged the Russians in the 
Tsushima Straits on 27–28 May 1905, and the Russian fleet was virtually 
annihilated. This decisive naval victory at Tsushima, together with 
increasing internal political unrest throughout Russia, brought the Russian 
government to the peace table.
　Although Japan had won the war decisively, Japan was by this time 
financially exhausted. As a result, Japan did not have the negotiating power 
many expected. Under the terms of the treaty, which was signed by both 
parties on September 5, 1905, Russia turned over Port Arthur to the 
Japanese, while retaining the northern half of Sakhalin Island, which lies off 
its Pacific coast. The Russians also agreed to leave Manchuria and 
recognize Japanese control of the Korean peninsula. However, Russia 
refused to pay indemnities to Japan. Japan’s total war expenditure was 
2,150 million yen, of which 38%, or 820 million yen, was raised overseas. 
The amount of financing was so huge that the debts still remained after 
World War I.
　Using the Russo–Japanese War as a natural experiment has some 
advantages. First, the ratio of government spending to GNP was relatively 
greater than that for other wars involving Japan. Japan experienced three 
great wars that required enormous government expenditure: the Sino–
Japanese War, 1894–1895; the Russo–Japanese War, 1904–1905; and 
WWII, 1941–1945. The Sino–Japanese War was the first war in which the 
Japanese military was modernized. Figure 1 shows the ratio of government 
expenditure to output from 1889 to 1937. The ratio in the Sino–Japanese 
war is the greatest in Japan before WWII. Moreover, military expenditure 
accounted for 50 percent of total government expenditure in the Sino–
Japanese War and 58 percent in WWII. In contrast, it accounted for 74 
percent in the Russo–Japanese War.5）
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　Second, in the Russo–Japanese War, as for the US in WWII, Japan was at 
war with Russia on foreign soil, and therefore fewer Japanese civilians were 
killed. The Japanese labor force totaled about 25 million workers at that 
time. While the number of dead was 85,000 (0.34% of the labor force), the 
number of injured was 150,000 (0.61% of the labor force). These fi gures are 
lower relative to not only other wars involving Japan, but also to other wars 
in general. Moreover, unlike the Sino–Japanese War, it is feasible to 
estimate data on hours worked during the Russo–Japanese War.
　Third, Japan gained only the southern half of Sakhalin and control of 
Korea, but did not receive any monetary compensation in the Treaty of 
Portsmouth in 1905. This implies that the Russo–Japanese War did not 
involve any monetary transfer to the Japanese economy, while requiring a 
Figure 1: The ratio of government expenditure to output







5） See Ohkawa et al. (1974, p. 22).
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vast amount of government spending.
　Fourth, the outbreak of this war was largely unexpected. According to 
Itaya (2012), Japanese bonds had been stable and priced at around 76 yen 
prior to the start of the war; however, the price dropped to 67 yen two 
days after the outbreak. Sussman and Yafeh (2000) point out that because it 
was generally believed that Japan would lose the war, a large risk premium 
was attached to Japanese bonds.6） Therefore, using government 
expenditure in this period is suitable for estimating the fiscal multiplier.
3. The Model
　BCA requires a neoclassical growth model, called a prototype economy, 
with four wedges: efficiency, labor, investment, and government 
consumption. Using the framework of a real business cycle model, these 
four wedges correspond to total factor productivity, taxes on labor income, 
taxes on investment, and the residual calculated by subtracting 
consumption and investment from output.
　Chari et al. (2007) show that the allocations of many DSGE models are 
the same as those provided by a prototype economy under certain 
conditions on the wedges. In other words, the wedges in BCA can 
represent any type of friction in DSGE models. Furthermore, the wedges 
are estimated to reproduce the actual data, so BCA allows us to simulate 
counterfactual situations, for instance, an economy that has only an 
efficiency wedge. If the wedges that are most important for replicating the 
actual data were known, the frictions equivalent to these wedges would be 
Fiscal multiplier in the Russo–Japanese War:A business cycle accounting perspective
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118
the major candidates for causes of business cycles.
　Before showing the prototype economy, we briefly explain the technical 
structure of BCA. In ordinary DSGE simulation, exogenous shock s t 
changes endogenous variable Yt, that is, Yt=f(s t) . For example, 
production, consumption expenditure, labor, etc. are used as endogenous 
variables. Since st is an artificial value, Yt obtained by simulation does not 
necessarily agree with the actual value. On the other hand, in the BCA 
method, we substitute actual values for Yt and use the inverse function to 





gives the actual value again. Analyzing the estimated wedge allows us to 
know when and how the wedge changed. This is a feature not found in 
ordinary DSGE. Moreover, by setting the wedge(s) to a value different 
from the reality, it is also possible to perform an counterfactual experiment 
which simulates how internal variables diverge from the reality. Although it 
is possible to know the extent of the impact of shock by historical 
decomposition in DSGE, BCA also has an advantage that it can be 
simulated without imposing strong assumptions about model structure and 
wedge.
　The model used in this paper is as follows. The representative household 
in the prototype economy maximizes its lifetime utility as follows:
  (1)
subject to the budget constraint,
  (2)
and the law of motion for capital,
  (3)
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where ct is consumption expenditure per capita, lt is labor supply per capita, 
Nt is population, xt is investment expenditure per capita, kt is capital stock 
per capita, Tt is government transfers per capita, wt is the wage rate, rt is 
the rental rate, xlt is the labor wedge, xxt is the investment wedge, b is the 
subjective discount rate, cn is the rate of population growth, d is the rate of 
depreciation, and U(.,.) is instantaneous utility.
　Firms maximize
 
where At is the efficiency wedge, F(.,.) is technology in terms of labor and 
capital, and cA is the labor-augmenting technological progress rate.
　The equilibrium of this prototype economy is summarized by the 
resource constraint
 




and (3), where gt is the government consumption wedge.
　Following Chari et al. (2007), we assume the instantaneous utility 






1-a. To remove the effect of long-run 
economic growth, we detrend the time series. Denoting z^ t ≡ Zt/((1+cA)t 
Nt), we obtain







　We also assume that the state at time t is st=(gt, At, xlt, xxt)' and the log-
linearized st follows a first-order VAR(1) process
 
 (9)
where f t is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and 
covariance matrix V. Unlike the earlier papers on BCA, we set the 
government consumption wedge gt to be the first variable in the state 
vector s t, because we use a Cholesky decomposition to conduct a 
counterfactual experiment in Section 5. The artificial shock on gt is 
provided only for 1904, so the decomposition does not affect the other 
periods.
　As we cannot solve the prototype model explicitly like other DSGE 
models, we log-linearize the model and apply the Uhlig (1995) method to 
derive the policy functions.7）
7） The code is available from the authors upon request.
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4. Fiscal Multipliers
　In this section, we explain how to calculate the fiscal multipliers using 
BCA. We divide the government consumption wedge into military 
expenditure, get, and others, that is, government consumption plus net 
export minus military expenditure, nxt. Log-linearizing the equation, we 
have
  (10)
where the variables without time subscripts,t, denote steady state values. 
We set military expenditure to be in a steady state, that is, g
~
e1904=0, and 
compare the simulated and actual GNP to identify the effect of government 
expenditure. Denoting the simulated GNP in 1904 as yt(g
~
e1904=0), we have 
the fiscal multiplier
 
This is a short-run fiscal multiplier. Moreover, the cumulative effect from 
1904 is defined as
 
which is called a long-run fiscal multiplier.
　We conduct simulations that set the deviation of a component of 
government expenditure, that is, only military expenditure, from the 
steady state equal to zero. We employ two types of counterfactuals. The 
first method uses the counterfactual government consumption wedge and 
three other actual wedges for 1904, so there is no spillover effect of the 
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x, 1904}. This 
method is different from that of Chari et al. (2007), which sets one of the 
wedges to be zero over the simulation period. This method investigates the 
direct effect of the government consumption wedge and ignores the indirect 
effect of the government consumption wedge on the other wedges.
　The second method substitutes the counterfactual government 
consumption wedge into the data-generating process of the wedges (9) to 
obtain the wedges over subsequent periods. In this case, the shock on the 
innovation of the government consumption wedge for 1904 first affects 
those of the other wedges, and thereafter affects them through the 
coefficient vector of the VAR. Therefore, we estimate two channels of the 









x, 1904} and the structural error f
^C
1904. For the estimation method of  f
^C
1904, 
see Appendix 1. At t>1904, we use the wedges simulated from the VAR
 
where f^ t is the residual from the actual data. After that, we estimate the 
wedges recursively. In this case, there is an indirect effect of the 
government consumption wedge, that is, all wedges vary from the actual 
wedge at t>1904.
　The sample period is short, so we constrain the parameter matrix, P, and 
covariance matrix, V, to estimate (9) efficiently. As for P, we assume that 
the government consumption wedge affects the other three wedges in the 
next period, but the converse is not true; that is,
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Chari et al. (2007) and Saijo (2008) also assume p21 = p31 = p41 =0. 
However, we do not use this restriction because we allow for a spillover 
effect from the government consumption wedge because military 
expenditure was the major component of government expenditure in this 
period; however, the economic condition does not necessarily affect the 
change in government expenditure. As for V, following Chari et al. (2007) 
and Saijo (2008), we assume
 
That is, errors of the government consumption wedge might have a 
correlation with those of the other three wedges, but errors of the other 
three wedges are uncorrelated with each other.
5. Data
　Here, we discuss the data used in the paper and the parameters of the 
model. The time period is 1889 to 1937 because of data availability 
limitations. Yt, Ct, and Xt are gross national expenditure, consumption 
expenditure, and gross domestic fixed capital formation, respectively, 
measured using fixed prices from Ohkawa et al. (1974) (hereafter, LTES 1). 
Kt is gross capital stock measured using fixed prices from Ohkawa and 
Shinohara (1979).
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　Since hours worked are not available during the sample period, we 
estimate them from several earlier studies. The estimated hours worked 
are quite stable, so the accuracy would not affect the result below. For 
details regarding labor supply, lt, see Appendix 2. We divide the variables 
by the number of those in the population who are over 10 years of age, Nt, 
to obtain per capita variables, yt, ct, xt, and k. We also detrend the variables 
by dividing them by (1+cA)t. To obtain the deviation from the steady state, 
we use a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with annual parameter m=100.
　The parameters are calibrated as follows. To estimate the labor-
augmenting technological progress rate, cA, we use
 
from the production function. The coefficient of t from the ordinary least 





Following Hayashi and Prescott (2008), the capital share, a, is 1/3, the 
subjective discount rate, b, is 0.96, and the depreciation rate, d, is 
0.038146, which is the average from 1889 to 1937. The population growth 
rate, cn, is 0.0117, which is the average growth rate of Nt.
　The time-allocation parameter, z, is calibrated from the intratemporal 
optimal condition. Prior to this, however, it is necessary to obtain the labor 
wedge. We set the target of the minimum value of the labor wedge to be 
3%, which is the ceiling of the labor income tax rates. In this period, the 
labor income tax rates were quite low relative to the present rates: they 
ranged from 1% for 300–1,000 yen of annual income up to 3% for 30,000 
yen. Additionally, the number of hours worked was high: the average 
number of weekly hours worked in the nonagricultural sector in our sample 
period is 68 hours. These facts suggest that the labor wedges are not very 
high. Therefore, we set the target of the labor wedge to be 3% and obtain 
125
z=0.9351.
　The government consumption wedge gt consists of government spending 
get and net export nxt. If nxt is negative and gt is negative, we cannot log-
linearize the prototype model. To obtain positive value of the variables, we 
divide the government consumption wedge into
 
where ext is exports and imt is imports. Log-linearizing this equation, we 
have
 
As get, ext, and imt are positive, we can use the HP filtered data for the 




　The counterfactual is that the deviation of government expenditure from 
the steady state in 1904, g
~
e1904, is zero. We employ the following four 
assumptions related to government expenditure.
　The first counterfactual is that military expenditure equals zero in 1904. 
The military and war-related expenditures are available from Emi and 
Shionoya (1966) (LTES 7). However, LTES 1 excludes government fixed 
capital formation from general government consumption expenditure and 
adds it to domestic fixed capital formation, so it is interpreted as military 
capital formation. Therefore, subtracting items related to fixed capital 
formation from military and war-related expenditures, we use expenditure 
related to conscription, war expenses (extraordinary military special 
account and ministries other than army and navy), and war-related 
expenses (military allowances in the form of aid, annuities, and pensions). 
We also remove duplications in the extraordinary military special account 
and other accounts. Furthermore, we should remove fixed capital formation 
Fiscal multiplier in the Russo–Japanese War:A business cycle accounting perspective
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from the extraordinary military special account, but these data are not 
available. Instead, we multiply the extraordinary military special account 
by the share of the sum of personnel expenses, consumption good 
expenses, provision and fodder, clothing, and transportation and 
communication to obtain military consumption expenditure. We call this 
broad military expenditure:
 Broad military expenditure=ME×g1,
where
　ME= expenditure related to conscription+war expenses+war-
related expenses-duplications,
　　g1= (personnel expenses+consumption goods+provision and 
fodder+clothing transportation and communication)/
extraordinary military special account.
　The second counterfactual is that military expenditure is defined in a 
narrower sense: broad military expenditure minus expenditure abroad for 
requisition; that is, expenditure related to provision and fodder and to 
transportation and communications. Ikeyama (2001) suggests that the 
Japanese army requisitioned provisions, e.g., rice, wheat, and soy sauce, 
from many domestic areas at low prices. However, because the Japanese 
government had a military currency on issue since the Sino–Japanese war 
in 1894–1895, it is unlikely that all provisions and fodders were 
requisitioned within Japan. Therefore, we also estimate the fiscal multiplier 
using narrow military expenditure:
 Narrow military expenditure=ME×g2,
where
 g2=(personnel expenses+consumption goods+clothing)
/extraordinary military special account.
　For comparison, we employ two more counterfactuals. The third 
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counterfactual is that the government consumption wedge equals zero in 
1904. This means that the change in the government consumption wedge in 
1904 is entirely the result of the war. This is the same assumption that was 
used in the simulations in earlier studies on BCA. The fourth counterfactual 
is that government expenditure equals zero in 1904. The government 
consumption wedge consists of government expenditure and net exports, so 
the latter is assumed to be influenced only by the war.
　As discussed in the introduction, military expenditure can be considered 
as unexpected or temporary shocks, so the third or fourth assumption is 
preferable in the sense of calculating the fiscal multiplier.
6. Results
　In this section, we present our estimation results. However, we first 
estimate the parameters of VAR(1). Table 1 presents the parameters of 
VAR(1) estimated using the maximum likelihood method. We use these 
parameters to estimate the wedges.
　The estimated wedges are shown in Figure 2. All the wedges rise 
dramatically for 1904, but they are not strongly correlated in the other 
period. The outbreak of war is a political issue, so most of the movement in 
the government consumption wedge in 1904 is exogenous. On the other 
hand, the other three wedges increase in the same way, so the movements 
are caused by the government consumption wedge.
　Following the earlier studies, e.g., Chari et al. (2007), we first simulate 
the model with only one wedge, that is, without three wedges over time. 
Figure 3 depicts the simulation results of the effect of each wedge on real 
GNP. The broken line is log-linearized output around the steady state, and 
the solid line is output without each wedge. As output without the 
Fiscal multiplier in the Russo–Japanese War:A business cycle accounting perspective
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Table 1: Parameters of the VAR(1) Process
Figure 2: Estimated wedges
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effi  ciency wedge is virtually unchanged, the effi  ciency wedge would be the 
most important factor for output. This is consistent with earlier studies. 
The labor and investment wedges affect output during the war to some 
extent. However, the latter is slightly volatile. By contrast, output without 
the government consumption wedge is different from actual output over 
time. While earlier studies rarely considered the eff ect of the government 
consumption wedge, our analysis implies that it plays an important role in 
this period.
　Next, Table 2 presents the estimates of the fi scal multipliers. The fi rst 
row shows the short-run fiscal multipliers without the spillover effects 
among wedges. The multipliers of the government consumption wedge and 
total government expenditure are 0.28 and 0.23, respectively. In the 
second row, the multipliers with the spillover effects are 0.30 and 0.25. 
Figure 3: Output data and predictions of the models with just one wedge
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The multipliers of broad and narrow military expenditures are 0.22 and 
0.20, respectively, which are relatively small. They are all less than one, as 
are the fiscal multipliers calculated from normal DSGEs. As shown in 
Woodford (2011), this is because government expenditure increases not 
only output but also the disutility of labor supply, causing a fall in output. 
Therefore, each of the military expenditures does not have a large effect on 
output in the short run.
　However, the long-run multipliers produce different results. This is 
because a temporary change in government expenditure can affect the 
capital stock after the shock and thereby change output. For the multiplier 
without spillovers, which does not consider the dynamic effects among the 
wedges, the fiscal multipliers of the government consumption wedge and 
government expenditure are 0.07 and 0.44, and those of broad and narrow 
military expenditures are 0.38 and 0.34, respectively. Although the 
multipliers without spillover effects are small in the short run, they are 
around double their short-run values in the long run. For the multiplier 
with spillovers, which allows the spillover effect after the shock of the 
government consumption wedge in 1904, the fiscal multipliers are larger 
Table 2: Fiscal multiplier
Estimation method Government Total Broad Narrow 
 consumption government military military 
 wedge expenditure expenditure expenditure 
Short-run 
w/o spillover 0.2825 0.2296 0.1994 0.1802 
w/ spillover 0.3067 0.2498 0.2170 0.1962 
Long-run  
w/o spillover 0.0720 0.4409 0.3816 0.3441 
w/ spillover 0.4012 1.1770 1.0561 0.9763 
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than those from the multiplier without spillovers, but they are around one. 
As military expenditure is more suitable as an unexpected shock of 
government consumption, we conclude that the fi scal multiplier in the long 
run is 0.98–1.06.
　To see this intuitively, we plot the change in output for each simulation. 
Figure 4 shows the change in output for the multiplier without spillovers. 
The shock to each variable increases output in 1904, but the effect 
disappears quickly. Figure 5 depicts the same simulation for the multiplier 
with spillovers. In this case, the shock in 1904 aff ects all wedges and the 
capital stock through the law of motion for capital, (3), and the VAR, (9). 
These effects increase output from 1904 to 1915, but they seem to 
disappear from 1916 onward. The reason why the fiscal multipliers with 
Figure 4:  Output data and predictions of the models without government 
expenditure in 1904, w/o spillover













y w/o broad military expenditure
y w/o narrow military expenditure
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spillovers are larger than those without spillovers is that the government 
consumption wedge in the multiplier with spillovers does not shrink after 
1904 because of the dynamic eff ect of the VAR. As the diff erence between 
the actual government consumption wedge and the simulated wedge in the 
multiplier without spillovers arises only in 1904, the effect of the 
government spending is limited.
　We next show the impulse-response functions for a shock in narrow 
military expenditure in 1904, which is the most reliable data for the 
government spending shock of the Russo–Japanese War. Figure 6 shows 
the results. The change in the government consumption wedge in 1904 
increases the other three wedges: the impacts are about 0.1 percent. The 
increases in the labor and investment wedges decrease output in 1904, 
Figure 5:   Output data and predictions of the models without government 
expenditure in 1904, w/ spillover













y w/o broad military expenditure
y w/o narrow military expenditure
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while the increase in the effi  ciency wedge increases output and the fi scal 
multiplier. Interestingly, consumption expenditure decreases temporarily 
in 1904, but increases afterward. This is partly because the labor wedge 
also increases after 1905. In standard macroeconomics, government 
expenditure crowds out consumption. However, our counterfactual 
experiment increases consumption.
　In summary, we found that the fi scal multiplier for the shock in 1904 is 
0.20–0.22 in the short run and 0.98–1.06 in the long run. These fi ndings are 
consistent with earlier studies, as discussed in the introduction.
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7. Concluding Remarks
　In this paper, we utilized BCA to estimate the fiscal multiplier during the 
Russo–Japanese War. BCA decomposes the frictions of many DSGEs into 
four wedges, which replicate exactly the actual endogenous variables. 
These features allow us to avoid the model misspecification that can occur 
in DSGE and VAR models.
　For estimating fiscal multipliers, data for the Russo–Japanese War period 
have the advantage that the war was unexpected and involved little damage 
to the capital stock or the labor force. We employed a government 
consumption wedge, total government expenditure, broad military 
expenditure, and narrow military expenditure as measures of government 
expenditure for the calculation of the multipliers.
　Using the BCA approach, we conclude that the short-run multiplier is 
0.20–0.22, and the long-run multiplier is 0.98–1.06. This is consistent with 
the results estimated using other methods in earlier studies.
　Large-scale fiscal expenditure seems to cause households and firms to 
expect future tax increases and reduce consumption expenditures by the 
same size. This is the result seen with a simple neoclassical model 
assuming rational agents and a frictionless economy. However, the results 
of this paper suggest that the prediction obtained from such a simple model 
does not hold. On the other hand, simulation by BCA alone can not know 
what route this result was derived. This point may be the limit of BCA. On 
the other hand, we can not analyze what kind of channel this result was 
derived by BCA simulation alone. This point may be the limit of this paper.
　Furthermore, our conclusion is drawn using a BCA approach, in which 
the prototype model is essentially a one-sector growth model with four 
stochastic wedges. On the other hand, Hayashi and Prescott (2008) and 
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Golosov et al. (2017) propose a two-sector model for macroeconomic 
analysis before WWII. Developing a two-sector model for BCA is left for 
future research.
Appendix 1: Estimation of simultaneous spillover effects
　The estimation method of the spillover effect of the government 
consumption wedge in 1904, f^C1904, is as follows. As we would like to set 
military expenditure g
~
et equal to zero only at t=1904 from (10), we seek a 
structural shock v1,1904 so that the government consumption wedge is (nx/
g)n
~
x1904. First, we use the estimated coefficient matrix P to obtain the 
residual:
 
Next, we implement a Cholesky decomposition on the variance–covariance 
matrix V=QQ' and obtain the structural shock:
 
This allows us to transform the error term ft into the idiosyncratic shock vt, 
in which each factor is not correlated with each other. Moreover, the first 
equation in (9) is an AR(1) process by assumption, so we would like to 







Using f^ 1,t=q11 v
^
1,t, we solve this equation to obtain the idiosyncratic shock 
of government military expenditure:
 
Finally, we replace the actual residual of the government consumption 
wedge with v^C1,1904:
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This is the simultaneous spillover effect. After this period, we calculate the 
wedges using (10).
Appendix 2: Construction of labor force data
　In this appendix, we provide details about the construction of labor force 
data. We could not find suitable aggregate labor force data for the prewar 
period for Japan. There are no aggregate data of hours worked in prewar 
Japan. In this appendix, we describe how we estimated the number of hours 
worked. For the agricultural sector only, we can utilize the number of 
employees, E at, and weekly hours worked, h
a
t, estimated by Shintani (1981) 
and Hayashi and Prescott (2008).
　For the nonagricultural sector, we use the number of gainful workers 
aged 10 years and older from Umemura et al. (1988) (LTES 2) as Ent. To our 
knowledge, there are no time series data of hours worked in the 
nonagricultural sector. Therefore, we use average daily hours worked in 
the cotton spinning industry from Fujino et al. (1979) (LTES 11, p.27). As 
the employees in this industry work on a two-shift system, we divide the 
data by two. The period average value is 10.82 hours.
　As it is implausible to assume that this industry was representative of all 
industries during the sample period, we further use the following three 
statistics to estimate a more accurate time series. First, Odaka (1990) 
investigates factory-level data from Aichi-ken Shokko Chosa, which surveys 
100 factories in six industries in 1894 in Aichi prefecture, and finds that the 
average daily number of hours worked is 11.9.8） Second, Shokko Jijo, 
published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (revised by 
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Inumaru (1998)) surveys 16 industries in 1901 and finds that the average 
daily number of hours worked is 11.75.9） Third, Rodo Undo Shiryo Kanko 
Iinkai (1959) estimates the average daily number of hours worked to be 11 
from 1908 to 1918. We calculate the average number of hours worked in 
the nonagricultural sector, hnt, as the average of these four averages, ((11.9
+11.75+11+10.82)/4=11.3675). That is, we multiply the daily number 
of hours worked in the cotton spinning industry by 11.3675/10.82=1.05 
to obtain hnt.
　To estimate the aggregate labor force data, we take the weighted 
average of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors,
 
where Nt is the population aged 10 and over from Umemura et al. (1988) 
(LTES 2). In this formula, assuming eight hours of sleep nightly, we divide 
hat by 16×6, which is the possible number of working hours (24 minus 8 
hours) multiplied by weekly days of work (6 days). In addition, we multiply 
hnt by 6/7 because h
n
t is calculated in terms of working days, that is,
hnt=hours worked during working days/6, and we divide this by the 
possible number of working hours (24 minus 8 hours).
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8） The industries comprise textiles, metal refining and processing, machinery and equipment, 
ceramics, chemicals, food, and others.
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